Dominican Vocations

It’s funny when you by chance encounter interviews with people you know.  Part I, Part II.

Mexico, Immigration, and the Flu Epidemic

There’s a flu epidemic in Mexico right now.  Given the United States’ weak border security, it’s only a matter of time before it reaches us.  But then again, I warned people of this two years ago.  Maybe if you people would start reading my blog more this wouldn’t have happened!

I have had a change of heart since my last post, at least in one respect:  I consider economic considerations to be legitimate reasons for protecting our borders.  It seems that anyone who is upset with the way Washington is throwing away our tax dollars in the current economic crisis must also be upset with illegal immigration.  Illegal immigrants have access to all sorts of government programs, including public education, which is growing more expensive by the year.  I remember two years ago reading that in my home county in St. Louis, the average cost of educating a student in the public schools was around $8000 (is that why we call it free education?).  In order to pay for illegal immigrants’ education, we will see either tax increases or a further increase in the size of the money supply.  

Illegal immigration is a bad thing, folks.  It is not a moral burden on our shoulders if an illegal immigrant comes to our door begging for food and we turn them in to the authorities (although we should give them a sandwhich while they wait).  Their circumstances may be bad back in Mexico, and our hearts may go out to them; but it is morally wrong for those immigrants to force us to pay for their education, health care, etc just because they live within our borders.  We may have a moral obligation to help Mexico become economically stable (whether that includes just throwing money at the problem is another story), but that is a separate question from whether people who immigrate illegally are not morally blameworthy for doing so.  Whatever the proper response to illegal immigrants is, complete sympathy is not one of them.

Conservative Accounts of Praeter Intentionem and the Common Good

Many people try to claim that we can restrict our intention in certain circumstances to the good outcome of our actions and not intend the bad outcome.  Examples include killing in self-defense or aborting a baby to save the mother’s life.  Although we psychologically aim at killing the assailant and the baby, we do not intend to do it (for those who haven’t read any of the literature, the distinction between the two may not be as silly as it first appears).   The unintended effect is considered outside the intention, i.e. praeter intentionem (PI).

Conservative accounts of PI often argue that liberal accounts of PI have trouble accounting for things that are intrinsically evil, among other things.  These arguments have a degree of plausibility; however, let’s assume, for instance, that killing in self-defense is not justified.  There is a tradition in the Catholic Church that public authorities have the right and obligation to kill if they intend to kill for the common good:   the common good is higher and more praiseworthy than an individual’s good, and unlike private citizens the public authority is not taking the law into his own hands.

If the conservative reader of PI accepts that the public authority can kill for the common good, he seems to have a problem explaining why such instances are not intrinsically evil.  Saying that the public authority can kill as long as he doesn’t intend to do so as a private citizen but rather as an agent of the common good seems to present an account of praeter intentionem which they didn’t allow on the level of the private individual.

But things get worse.  If the public authority has all of this power to do what private individuals are morally forbidden to do, how can things like torture be considered intrinsically evil?  It seems worse to put a bullet through someone’s head than to waterboard them, and yet public officials have the power to do the former for the sake of the common good, but not the latter.  But this is just a weak version of the problem:  in what way does any government do wrong if it claims to be acting for the common good?  Can a government bomb civilian targets in a war because it is acting for the common good, i.e. the peace and order of the society doing the bombing?  If not, why not?

In my opinion, the problem of justifying the coercive power of the state is just as problematic and important as developing an adequate account of PI.  Conservative PI’ers have difficulties restraining the power of the state; liberal PI’ers have difficulties explaining how any private individual is not a public official, i.e. he has trouble accounting for intrinsic evils among private citizens.

The Shrinking Middle Class

Scary stuff.  [ht]

CNN Teaparty Story

If you haven’t seen this yet, do.  It’s a video of the behind-the-scenes of the CNN coverage of the recent teaparties.  Some woman takes the CNN reporter to task for irresponsible reporting, and it’s a gem.

The article itself is also interesting.

Hattip to William Vallicella

This week, the Maverick Philosopher has written a few wonderful posts regarding taxation. He also has written a priceless aphorism this month.

A Quick Word on Divorce

I’ve heard it twice from two rather educated  Catholics this week, so I think I need to say something to correct the error.  Contrary to popular belief, civil divorce is not forbidden by the Catholic Church, and in some circumstances may be the right thing to do.  Remarriage is the sin, not divorce.

Here’s why.  According to the Church, civil divorce does not end a marriage.  Marriage lasts until one of the married persons dies.  And while divorce may be a sin (for example, getting divorced for a bad reason, such as one spouse cheating on another), in other cases it may be the right thing to do in some cases.  For example, a husband may be abusive, and the wife needs to cut of all ties in order to protect herself or her children.

If one is unsure whether one has a good reason or not, he or she needs to contact their parish priest and ask for guidance.  Also, the married persons need to acknowledge the sanctity of the Sacrament they have received, and not be under the mistaken impression that civil divorce dissolves the Sacramental bond.

On the other hand, remarriage while one’s spouse is still alive is sinful.  Remarriage would be the equivalent of committing adultery, sleeping around on one’s spouse.  The bond of marriage is not broken due to civil divorce, even if one’s spouse is a creap.  It is important to note the distinction between civil divorce and remarriage:  it does no one any good to alienate people from the Church for bad reasons.

Nota Bene:  Although divorce may be a good idea in some cases, priests should be careful when, if ever, recommending it in the Confessional because he risks being sued for encouraging someone for breaching a contract; but that is a purely civil matter, not a religious one.

The Difference between “Cannot” and “Can Not”

In the reply to the seventh objection in De Malo question 6, Thomas Aquinas writes:

“Something active necessarily causes only when it overcomes the power of something passive. And since the will is potential regarding good in general, only something good in every respect overcomes the power of the will so as necessarily to move the will, and the only such good is the perfect good that is happiness. And the will cannot not will this good; that is, the will cannot will the contrary. Nevertheless, the will is able not actually to will happiness, since the will can avoid thinking about happiness insofar as the will moves the intellect to its activity. And in this respect, neither does the will necessarily will happiness itself. Just so, persons would not necessarily become warm if they could at will repel heat.”

The response itself is fascinating, but for now I want to limit my examination to the difference between cannot and can not.  There is a difference between being unwilling and not willing something.  To be unwilling is to will that a certain state of affairs not be.  For instance, I will that abortion not be sponsored by the federal and state governments.  Some people, however, are neither willing nor unwilling to see a state of affairs exist.  For instance, there are people who have not given any thought to the abortion controversy, and thus they do not care whether abortion is legal.  These people are not willing to see abortion kept legal (or illegal, for that matter).  Thus, there is a difference between being unwilling and not-willing.

Similarly, there is a difference between cannot and can not.  To express the difference, let us use the example of willing something.  When I say that I cannot will something, I am saying that I am unwilling to will it.  However, when I say that I can not will something, I am saying that I am not willing some state of affairs to be.

Take another example.  There is a difference between saying, “it is impossible that x” (i.e. x cannot be) and saying “it is possible that not-x” (i.e. x can not be).  The first indicates a necessary state of affairs, mainly that x cannot be.  The second expresses contingency, mainly that x can not be.  Nevertheless, it leaves it open whether x must not be.

It’s NOT just because it’s Beer…

it’s because the new Oregon tax on beer cannot possibly be proposed by rational beings. Yes, one way of reducing deficits is to raise taxes; but raising the cost of a barrel of beer 1900% won’t increase revenue, it will destroy the beer business. Since this is patently obvious to any person with average intelligence, one is left to wonder whether stupid people are attracted to politics, or whether politics makes one stupid.

Or, maybe these politicians WANT to destroy the beer industry?

Reductionism and the Problem of Universals

Reductionism is the philosophical thesis that all reality is in principle explicable soley in terms of the sciences of physics and chemistry.  Those who oppose reductionism devote much time to the task of finding some element in nature that is not reducible to the physics and chemistry.

However interesting that project may be, is it necessary?  It seems to me that reductionism can never be undubitably established until certain metaphysical problems are solved, such as the problem of universals.  Explaining all of a thing’s properties in terms of its parts does not explain why that particular thing can be said to be the same kind of thing as another.  What gives a dog its intelligibility as a dog?  Unless a satisfying solution can be offered that accounts for that intellibility, reductionism does not seem to be established.

While the scientific enterprise is a necessary component of establishing the truth of reductionism, it is not a sufficient component.  There is no way to avoid the philosophical aspect of the claim.