Many people try to claim that we can restrict our intention in certain circumstances to the good outcome of our actions and not intend the bad outcome. Examples include killing in self-defense or aborting a baby to save the mother’s life. Although we psychologically aim at killing the assailant and the baby, we do not intend to do it (for those who haven’t read any of the literature, the distinction between the two may not be as silly as it first appears). The unintended effect is considered outside the intention, i.e. praeter intentionem (PI).
Conservative accounts of PI often argue that liberal accounts of PI have trouble accounting for things that are intrinsically evil, among other things. These arguments have a degree of plausibility; however, let’s assume, for instance, that killing in self-defense is not justified. There is a tradition in the Catholic Church that public authorities have the right and obligation to kill if they intend to kill for the common good: the common good is higher and more praiseworthy than an individual’s good, and unlike private citizens the public authority is not taking the law into his own hands.
If the conservative reader of PI accepts that the public authority can kill for the common good, he seems to have a problem explaining why such instances are not intrinsically evil. Saying that the public authority can kill as long as he doesn’t intend to do so as a private citizen but rather as an agent of the common good seems to present an account of praeter intentionem which they didn’t allow on the level of the private individual.
But things get worse. If the public authority has all of this power to do what private individuals are morally forbidden to do, how can things like torture be considered intrinsically evil? It seems worse to put a bullet through someone’s head than to waterboard them, and yet public officials have the power to do the former for the sake of the common good, but not the latter. But this is just a weak version of the problem: in what way does any government do wrong if it claims to be acting for the common good? Can a government bomb civilian targets in a war because it is acting for the common good, i.e. the peace and order of the society doing the bombing? If not, why not?
In my opinion, the problem of justifying the coercive power of the state is just as problematic and important as developing an adequate account of PI. Conservative PI’ers have difficulties restraining the power of the state; liberal PI’ers have difficulties explaining how any private individual is not a public official, i.e. he has trouble accounting for intrinsic evils among private citizens.
June 4, 2009 at 10:39 pm |
It has never been so difficult a question for me. It seems the distinction should be quite clear. WWII is a perfect example of that. People will tell you any number of things about how much anyone knew what was going on in Germany, but let me assure you when the shooting was coming to an end and the concentration camps began to be liberated it was no surprise what was “discovered.” I would say tat if there were any evil taking place in the American political thinking it was our delayed entry into the war. If we had acted when Hitler first invaded Poland we could have played an effective role in the Battle of Britian and probably ended the fighting much sooner than we actually did.
But that was an obvious example. What it really comes to for me is what Jesus told us, “To him who much has been given, much will be expected.” There is much more at stake than personal sin on the shoulders of the head of a household, of the boss in the office, of the mayor, of the judge, of the state legislators, of the govenors and on the shoulders of the president,of a bishop or of parish pastor. These people have charges under their care and will have to answer to God for the welfare (or lack of it) of the people God has entrusted to them.
I lament the day I have to cause harm to someone in a home invasion, but do not doubt I know exaclty what I am capable of an have the conviction to act. That holds true for any office I may hold from man of the house all the way up to president of the US. The way to draw the line in what is rightful action and what is abuse of power is given to us by St. Paul: “Love covers a multitude of sins.” If I have no love for those under my care no matter what I do it will be motivated for selfish ends and I will not be looking out for the welfare of my charges. I will be looking out for the welfare of myself. If I love those under my care I stand a fighting chance of practicing wisdom in my convictions and restraint of my hand. With wisdom and Godly councel I will be able to discern the correct course of action in the heat of the moment.
June 7, 2009 at 3:13 pm |
Joel, I’m a bit wary of using examples concerning governments and the public good to discuss PDE for the very reasons I mention above. Formulating an adequate PDE is difficult as it is without adding governments into the mix. The point of my post was just that, to show how a species of such proposed PDE’s fails to get something out of it that we desire.
As for your other examples. I don’t think anyone denies that people in positions of authority have difficult decisions to make. The question is whether they can make some of those decisions without sin. Let’s assume for a moment that you kill a man who breaks into your house in order to protect your family. St. Thomas, as well as the Catholic Church, teaches that the ends and the means of an act must be good in order for the act to be good. But in this example, killing seems to be a means towards the end of saving one’s family. The conservative PDE advocate is going to charge this person with back-door consequentialism.
Furthermore, the conservative PDE’r will argue for the prima facie most intuitive and common sense definition of ‘intrinsically evil act’ as one that is wrong despite one’s intentions, an object that cannot be chosen under any circumstances. Thus, to defend oneself with the intention of killing–no matter what the further circumstances–is wrong. To say otherwise would be to say that intrinsically evil acts can be justified if the circumstances are right, which is to say that there are no such things as intrinsically evil acts.
I don’t think the St. Paul example works, either. At best, it is question-begging against the conservative, who would argue that you cannot be acting lovingly towards a person while you are intending to kill them.
In sum, I don’t think it’s that simple; in fact, I think the problem is extraordinarily complicated. As much as I think the conservative position leads to some undesirable consequences, their charge of consequentialism against their opponents deserves to be taken seriously. If e.g. killing in self-defense is permissible, there needs to be a way of describing the act a) in a non-arbitrary way that b) adequately explains the killing as a foreseen and not intended side effect of the act and c) is not part of the means.
The conservative answer is appealing because it is simple: when intentionally killing in self-defense, the killing belongs to the means and is therefore wrong. The object of the game is to show that killing is not a part of the means. The only way to discover the right answer will be through prayer, the virtues, a cap of intelligence +5, and a string of lucky dice rolls.